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DEFINITION OF THE TERM: Arriving at an adequate definition of the 
term “violence” is problematic due to the complexity involved in under-
standing the intentions of a perpetrator of violence. different approaches 
to violence depend on the researcher’s methodological and contentual 
approach. 
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TERM: the article outlines the his-
torical context of the various approaches to violence, including those of 
the sophists and those formulated within modern political philosophy 
founded on the ideas of thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques rousseau. the 
two concepts differ but share the conviction that institutional violence 
used by a sovereign is an important aspect of enforcing legal order in 
a state.
DISCUSSION OF THE TERM: Violence is not a typical ethical problem. 
In this section of the article, the causes of violence are analysed and char-
acterised from psychological, sociological, and cognitive science perspec-
tives. Violent behaviour is treated as resulting from both individual and 
socio-institutional dysfunctions. Analysis is based on axiological theories 
(max scheler), political philosophy (Hannah Arendt), theories based on 
cognitive research on the causes of evil (simon baron-Cohen), and the 
findings of social psychologists and sociologists who investigate violence 
(Irena Pospiszyl, Agnieszka widera-wysoczyńska, Jacek Pyżalski). 
SYSTEMATIC REFLECTION WITH CONCLUSIONS AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS: the philosophical approach to violence seeks to 
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understand the essential nature of violence, which in the context of this 
article is understood as a key aspect of moral evil. we often encounter 
various forms of aggression and violence (both physical and mental) in 
social life. recently, we have witnessed an intensification of verbal and 
pictorial violence within the media. this section of the article lists the 
publications that are devoted to violence (apart from those that are 
included in the references).
Keywords: institutional violence, ethical attitude, ethical 
personalism, ethics of nonviolence, Arendt, Baron-Cohen
259Violence
definition of the term
Violence is present in all known societies. Although it is true that perpe-
trators of violence are always people with certain psychological predis-
positions, the functioning of an organization or a state can make certain 
processes weaker or stronger. In structures in which intimidation and 
violence are present, an atmosphere of constant fear and threat is cre-
ated. Employees feel bad as they fail to develop and are oriented towards 
short-term and pragmatic goals; an internally conflicted company is one 
that ceases to develop. Social (political) ethics critically evaluates those 
situations in which violence is used. It is not only about stigmatising 
people who use violence but also about eliminating situations that are 
conductive to the emergence of phenomena based on violence. 
 Social (political) ethics analyses the phenomenon of violence as 
a form of moral evil which has certain observable direct consequences 
but also consequences that are remote in time. For the sake of order, 
it should be pointed out that there are circumstances in which we have 
a problem with an unequivocal assessment of violence as a moral evil. 
When used in self-defence, violence is a reaction to violence. On the 
one hand, according to the ethical imperative to protect one’s own life, 
one must defend oneself against an aggressor; on the other hand, the 
use of violence in an act of retaliation is another form of moral evil. In 
the case of evil inflicted on us by another person, it is better to rely on 
legal norms and court decisions than on one’s own judgment. Of course, 
this is not possible in a life-threatening situation to which we must react 
immediately. Then the question arises of what adequate means are 
when used for our defence. In this situation, violence may result from an 
unintended direct consequence of our actions. Generally, we deal with 
moral evil when the result of a person’s act is harm done to himself or to 
another person or the violation of some public good of significant value. 
However, we have the right and the duty to protect our own lives even 
when – under certain circumstances – we have to use violence against 
a person who poses a potential threat to us.
 Political ethics is interested in moral assessment of the social dimen-
sion of human life. This is particularly true of institutional structures in 
which certain human relationships are formed that are based on trust, 
cooperation, subordination, a motivational system, and punishment for 
260 mArIusz woJewodA
work not done properly. The fundamental question is whether the forms 
of institutional life that we know are just or whether they are based on 
some form of violence. Social ethics, as opposed to individual ethics, 
relates to institutional structures and has a specific moral action in 
mind: the sphere of praxis (Anzenbacher, 2010, pp. 16–18). This raises 
some questions: Do our institutions serve the common good? Do they 
generate some form of violence? Are employees of these institutions 
conscious perpetrators of violence or will-less tools who merely carry 
out the orders of their superiors? However, “will-lessness” or “thought-
lessness” is not being devoid of guilt, but rather it should be treated 
as an expression of an employee’s attitude whereby he gives up his 
conscious freedom of action in favour of subordination to an institution. 
In such a situation, an employee transfers moral responsibility to the 
decision-maker, who, in a way, makes decisions on his behalf. However, 
this results in the individual “escaping” moral responsibility or having 
a sense of guilt for the consequences of physical or mental violence, 
which is inappropriate.
 Social (political) ethics is based on certain normative assumptions 
that result from the conviction that one should 1) respect the dignity of 
the human person, 2) care about the values of community life, 3) act 
responsibly, 4) realize the postulate of good communication, 5) maximize 
social benefits and minimize suffering. These principles are inscribed in 
specific ethical concepts: personalism, communitarianism, utilitarianism, 
the ethics of responsibility, and communication ethics (Anzenbacher, 
2010, pp. 106–130). Any differences in the theoretical bases of these 
concepts do not affect the fact that they consider violence to be a moral 
evil. Based on values and accepted principles, the following are judged 
as appropriate/inappropriate and just/unjust: the behaviour of specific 
individuals; social relationships; actual communication practices; the 
rules under which individuals and institutions function; and management 
models in organisations. Ethical reflection that is based on the critical 
analysis of the functioning of institutional structures formulates propos-
als to change or improve these structures in order to eliminate violence; 
largely, this is done within ethical personalism. 
 Using the terms “good” and “evil” is problematic due to their ambigu-
ity. This particularly applies to the concept of evil, especially when we 
focus on institutional violence, which involves not physical violence but 
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various forms of psychological violence (e.g. mobbing or other forms of 
psychological harassment). The perpetrator’s subjective perception 
of what is good or bad may be different from what is considered good or 
bad from a social perspective and different from the point of view of the 
violation of fundamental moral principles and values, e.g. human dignity. 
Sometimes, violent individuals find justification for their behaviour or shift 
responsibility for it to external circumstances (e.g. alcoholism, poverty, 
violence inflicted on them by others) or to their victim; they may put the 
blame for their violent behaviour onto their victim with the specious justifi-
cation that the victim provoked them to resort to violence. Moral facts can 
be analysed from different perspectives: those of perpetrators, victims, 
institutions, or witnesses. Subjective perception of a given behaviour 
does not affect the nature of the assessment of violent behaviour.
 Institutional violence can be explained by excessive rivalry, which, 
instead of contributing to the efficiency and effectiveness of the institu-
tion, changes into devastating rivalry that undermines trust within the 
team. This is the case with competition for a job, salary, or for credits 
which translate into an assessment of an employee’s usefulness. With 
the direct intention of improving the quality of the work of the team, 
rivalry may consequently lead to violence. Bullying is an indirect form of 
rivalry, and sometimes it is not intended by its perpetrator(s). However, 
understanding the psychological or social causes of violent acts does 
not change any negative moral evaluation of the act of violence itself.
Historical analysis of the term
From the point of view of political ethics, the origins of philosophical 
reflection on violence should be sought in ancient concepts of political 
philosophy and philosophy of the state. In antiquity, the Sophists exam-
ined the issues related to the state and the rules governing life in the 
polis. Protagoras, the precursor of this trend, considered himself both 
a specialist in practical skills and a professional teacher of wisdom that 
was closely related to the polis (city-state) and its needs. His reflections 
were continued by Hippias, Gorgias, Thrasymachus, and Callicles. In 
ancient Greece, practical wisdom was treated (as it is today) as a way 
of earning social prestige, gaining lucrative employment, or as a means 
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to leading a fulfilled life. The main educational goal of the Sophists 
was to educate leaders. Leaders were chosen from among the wisest 
citizens, i.e. those who had mastered both political and communica-
tion skills (e.g. they were able to convince the citizens to support their 
ideas) and the art of rhetoric (in Greek: techne). A sage-politician must 
not be like a sheep dog but like a wolf among sheep. Referring to the 
metaphor of a wolf and sheep, the Sophists believed that the wolf-ruler 
gains control over a herd of sheep in the fight against other wolves. In 
certain circumstances, he must also use violence against sheep that 
do not submit to his will. The dispute over how to understand justice 
in the state that took place between the Sophists and Socrates and 
his disciple Plato influenced both ancient and later understandings of 
the foundations of social order in the state. The Sophists believed in 
axiological-ethical relativism and acknowledged that justice is a relative 
value and depends on the will of the ruler. Plato maintained an opposite 
position, i.e. axiological-ethical objectivism, which recognized justice as 
an objective value. When citizens of the polis learnt about justice, they 
were able to judge the acts of the ruler as just or unjust. Based on the 
Sophists’ reasoning, it should be assumed that the will of the ruler and 
the principles of justice are the same. However, given the multidimen-
sional nature of the various representatives of this trend, the Sophists’ 
views on justice eventually led to the justification of tyranny and resort-
ing to violence and coercion in order to enforce the obedience of the 
citizens (Korkiewicz, 1995, pp. 231–241).
 In the context of exercising power in a state or an organisation, coercion 
often becomes a prelude to institutional violence. Much depends on how 
we define the moral competence of the person-citizen. In other words, 
what are we like by nature? If we consider that a person, at his deepest 
spiritual foundation, is good, then it is necessary to strengthen his positive 
attitude towards working with others in order to create community. This 
should be achieved by means of the maieutic method, which is a dia-
logical method that was proposed by Socrates to educate and persuade. 
This thesis was recognised by Aristotle, for example, who treated man 
as a zoon politicon, i.e. a social being. If we accept the opposite thesis 
that man is an egoist who is focused on his own pleasure or benefit – 
a creature capable of taking goods away from others – then we must 
control his selfish tendencies. Although Protagoras considered man good 
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by nature, the bloody conflicts between Greek poleis during the Pelopon-
nesian War led younger Sophists to believe that man is an egoist. Man 
becomes a social being after a system of punishment is applied; through 
legally sanctioned violence, man is forced to accept the rules of life in 
a polis. Medieval philosophy was dominated by Aristotle’s view of human 
nature, which did not, however, affect the fact that at that time institutional 
state violence and institutional ecclesiastical violence were frequently 
used tools for disciplining citizens and members of church communities. 
The origins of modern political philosophy are linked to Thomas Hobbes, 
who returned to a pessimistic view of human nature. An individual’s 
inclinations to use violence against other individual, with the fear and 
insecurity that results from it, were a key reason for choosing a sovereign, 
i.e. a ruler whose will had to be obeyed. At the same time, this led to 
sanctioning the institutional violence used by rulers against their subjects 
(Hobbes, 2005, pp. 307–309). In Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s concept, the 
sovereign is replaced by a people’s assembly, but the essence of state 
compulsion based on violence does not change. According to Rousseau, 
man possesses elements of primordial good (conscience), but his human 
nature has been depraved by civilisation and determined by the desire 
to own property. Consequently, the introduction of new political rules that 
are based on the will of the people involves institutional violence. Law 
that is based on a social contract is a criterion for distinguishing between 
good and evil. When forced to engage in unwanted but at the same time 
necessary protection against the effects of the evil desire to possess 
goods and to have an advantage over others, the human mind decides to 
acknowledge violence and the system of penalties. In ancient, medieval, 
and modern concepts, the political order was based on the will of a sover-
eign – a single man or a group of people (Rousseau, 1956, pp. 176–187). 
The idea of exercising power based on impersonal rules that result from 
procedures and algorithms has only emerged in the modern era. 
discussion of the term
From an axiological perspective, violence is a negative value that requires 
opposing by means of specific procedures. A moral action that is based 
on a sensitive conscience is a sign of opposition to a situation in which 
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violence is used. This is not just about inflicting violence on others, but 
also about reacting actively and responsibly when we witness actual or 
alleged violence ourselves. This includes situations involving violence in 
the workplace, domestic violence that we witness as neighbours, or verbal 
violence in public spaces. A lack of violence can be treated as an axi-
ological opposition to violence. To broaden this perspective, following the 
German axiologist, Max Scheler, it can be claimed that positive values are 
those that encourage us to realize them, while negative values are those 
that encourage us to oppose them actively (Scheler, 1988, pp. 62–63). 
Thus, anti-violence values include respect for the other person, tolerance, 
recognition, trust, and the ability to cooperate despite different characters 
and attitudes to the world. However, not all behaviours can be tolerated, 
just as not all life strategies are acceptable. Tolerance should be under-
stood as a value in relation to other values that define the principles of 
social coexistence. In this sense, one should not tolerate people resorting 
to violence. This is especially important when we talk about institutional 
structures in which superiors inflict violence on their subordinates. The 
demand to act for the good of an institution cannot be placed above the 
good of those working in it. Following the premises of ethical personalism 
and Catholic Social Teaching, we assume the primacy of man over objects 
and, consequently, the primacy of man over the good of the institution. 
 Descriptive social ethics can take advantage of the findings of moral 
psychology and cognitive science by looking, for example, for the causes 
of violence in the individual thinking and acting determinants of people 
with specific mental or social dysfunctions (psychopaths, sociopaths). 
The sociology of morality tells us where to look for the social causes of 
violence, most often as an element of determinants that are linked to 
family, economic, and/or organizational factors. In order to explain the 
phenomenon of violence, it is necessary to determine what conditions 
must be met for a given behaviour to be considered violent. Usually these 
conditions include the behaviour of the perpetrator(s), the intentions of the 
acting persons, and the consequences suffered by the victims of violence.
 According to one definition of violence, it is 
any non-incidental act which damages an individual’s personal freedom or con-
tributes to the physical and psychological harm to a person that goes beyond the 
social rules of mutual relations (Pospiszyl, 2008, p. 57).
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The subject literature distinguishes between physical and psychological 
violence. The former concerns behaviours that are related to the risk of 
bodily harm (regardless of whether it ultimately occurs) and which result 
in an actual injury to the victim. The latter, i.e. psychological violence, 
consists of words and verbal and non-verbal behaviours or attitudes aimed 
to maintain control over another person by reducing his self-esteem, creating 
helplessness in him, and negatively affecting his perception of the meaning of 
life. Such actions are intentional in nature. The perpetrator will do anything to 
control the emotions and thoughts of the victim in order to satisfy his own needs 
(Widera-Wysoczyńska, 2010, p. 37).
These definitions point to the essential role of the intentional factor in 
the perpetrator’s conduct. However, this issue is problematic, as it is not 
always possible to identify this intentional factor. A violent intention may 
be incorporated into a number of other intentions, or the perpetrator may 
not be aware of the fact that his organising activities involve violence. 
This is especially true in the case of psychological violence. 
 There is a difference between harming another person and inflicting 
violence. The former means an act of absolute evil, because it is impos-
sible to do harm (to do evil) for the sake of good. It is not about people 
with psychopathic tendencies but about those considered “normal”, well 
adapted to the rules of social life, and able to coexist and cooperate with 
others. It is important to realize that the term psychologically “normal” 
is problematic. It may just so happen that people with psychopathic or 
sociopathic tendencies work in institutions, but this does not explain 
the nature of institutional violence. For example, if the boss, who is not 
a psychopath, is the perpetrator of a violent act, his decision may benefit 
the institution in which he works even if it results in violence involving 
harm to his employees. In such a case, violence is simply a technical 
tool that is utilised to discipline employees and is aimed at improving 
the quality of the company’s operations, for example by assigning new 
duties to an employee, changing his current duties, or replacing him 
with someone else, even though he has performed his duties well. This 
can result in psychological harm to employees, which can be expressed 
through professional burnout, depression, or suicide. This is especially 
true of people who are fragile and cannot cope with life’s failures effec-
tively. A person who resorts to institutional violence against employees 
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does not call it violence but associates it with actions that aim to optimize 
the functioning of the organization rather than actions that aim to harm 
others.
 The functioning of an institution does not always involve violence: 
it is more often an aberration or a deviation from the norm, although it 
is inherent in human nature. However, within structures in which vio-
lence is in some sense considered a normal state of affairs, it ultimately 
translates into the quality of the employees’ lives. When considered 
on a global scale, violent structures lead to economic exploitation, an 
increase of social inequalities, debt, and the instrumental treatment 
of human resources and natural goods. On the one hand, structural 
violence is associated with poverty, social exclusion, the professional 
incompetence of poorly educated people, and an inability to change 
one’s pathological environment. On the other hand, structural violence 
leads to a loss of trust, a sense of helplessness, a lack of commitment 
to improving the functioning of the organisation and, as a consequence, 
a lack of hope that the individual will be able to change the pathological 
environment in which he lives or works (as he considers that it must 
remain this way). Interestingly, the perpetrators of institutional violence, 
as opposed to domestic violence, are most often kind, success-oriented 
people who have a good reputation regarding their professional compe-
tence and social skills. 
 An additional dimension of analyses of verbal violence concerns 
internet communication in which the intentions of the sender of the mes-
sage are to ridicule, mock, offend, and harass. These terms refer to vari-
ous forms of psychological violence. As a result of the uninhibited nature 
of the internet and the apparent anonymity it affords, its users believe 
that the need to observe the rules of proper public communication do 
not apply to them. Illusory anonymity (the internet is a public space) 
gives users a twisted consent to verbal aggression. Internet violence 
directed at specific recipients takes the form of electronic violence, 
called cyberbullying. A person who does such things is called a stalker. 
This phenomenon was investigated based on analysing the commu-
nication strategies of (mainly) young people. It seems that electronic 
aggression is now spreading amongst people of all ages and all walks 
of life (Pyżalski, 2012, 15–20). Among Polish-speaking internet users, 
problems that are related to the exchange of words based on aggression 
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concern disputes over political and worldview preferences. However, 
the issue of internet violence needs further study, which exceeds the 
scope of this article.
Causes of violence
In the context of contemporary cognitive research, violence is associ-
ated with moral evil. The inclination to do evil to others is understood 
in terms of a lack of empathy, i.e. the ability to feel compassion and 
to co-think with others. This lack is treated as a kind of psychological 
dysfunction that results in inflicting pain and causing suffering to other 
people. The tendency of some people to inflict violence on others is fre-
quently linked to the experiences of war and mass extermination during 
World War II. However, violence that is committed on a massive scale 
exposes a problem that is somehow inscribed in the human condition 
and is independent of time; violence is a behaviour that treats the other 
person instrumentally, i.e. as an object. From an ethical point of view, 
this behaviour means rejecting or not respecting the personalistic norm, 
i.e. the postulate to treat the other person and oneself as an end, never 
as a means. Immanuel Kant was the author of the personalistic norm, 
which was adapted to Christian thought by Karol Wojtyła (Wojtyła, 1986, 
pp. 67–68). Lack of empathy makes us treat other people as objects we 
can use to maximize economic profit, to give us pleasure, or to secure 
the realization of political or institutional goals.
 All kinds of addictions, e.g. to drugs, alcohol, the internet, or work, are 
examples of the instrumental treatment of oneself. We usually do not 
equate such situations with violence towards ourselves, although there 
is much to suggest that we should. The number of things that one can 
become addicted to is huge. The essence of addiction lies in narrowing 
down and disrupting one’s perception of the world. It manifests itself in 
a fear of losing control over oneself and other people. Addiction, with its 
related brain disorders, can lead to violence against others in order to 
maintain control over them and, indirectly, over oneself and one’s own 
decisions. In their daily activities, most people do not show empathy for 
the needs and suffering of others unless they are our nearest and dear-
est, with whom we are emotionally connected. An emotional experience 
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of being angry with someone may lead us to consider the hypothetical 
harm we might want to do to this person, but in most cases we abstain 
from this. We remain at the level of imagining such a situation, but we 
refrain from actual action. From the researchers’ point of view, it is 
interesting to consider why some people go beyond these images and 
use violence. This phenomenon is analysed in the context of empathy-
related cerebral responses that are switched on or off. However, this 
is still not a conclusive study because we know little about the proper 
functioning of the human brain (Baron-Cohen, 2014, pp. 19–30).
 When the switch for empathy is turned off, we think primarily of our 
own needs and interests. When the empathy switch is turned on, we take 
the welfare, interests, and situation of others into account. There are two 
stages of empathy: recognition and reaction. Both are necessary because 
they refer to sensitivity to harm being done and to an active attitude, i.e. 
one of helping the victim. A lack of empathy means that a perpetrator of 
violence is unable to feel compassion towards the victim or imagine that 
he might be in the victim’s shoes one day, or that a witness of violence 
being inflicted on others is unable to oppose it. Passive observers often 
involuntarily agree to violence when they are not directly affected by it. In 
social psychology, this type of behaviour is explained by obedience to the 
authority principle (as shown in the experiments of the American psychol-
ogist Stanley Milgram, for example) or by the social proof principle. The 
former revealed that the presence of an authority figure (an experimenter 
dressed in a medical doctor’s uniform) removed responsibility from most 
of the participants of the experiment. Under the influence of the presence 
of an authority, the participants decided to apply penalties that they prob-
ably would not have applied under other circumstances. Of course, the 
role of an authority can be played by the state, institutions, corporations, or 
other individuals who have the power to influence others psychologically 
and are able to convince the system’s officers to use coercive measures, 
even when they involve some form of violence.
 The lack of social reaction to evil experienced by others is explained 
by the social proof principle. People who witness violence or watch 
violence from a safe distance believe that someone else should react 
and actively oppose it, rather than themselves. Inactivity and withdrawal 
from reaction to evil very often leads to its involuntary acceptance and 
then a social escalation of violence. An extreme example of this type 
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of phenomenon is the increase in violence in totalitarian states (Hitler-
ism in Germany, Stalinism in the Soviet Union in the 20th century) and 
the associated passive attitude or even acceptance of the majority of 
society. This occurred in accordance with the belief that justified this 
passivity: that apparently the victims must have deserved it, which is 
why the system’s officers use violence-based measures against them. 
A passive observer thinks that he is acting honestly and that it is not his 
business or that it will not happen to him. When the system’s officers 
come for him, there is no one else to protest.
 The social scale of empathic sensitivity varies; it is a continuum, at one 
end of which people have zero empathy. Alcohol intoxication, fatigue, 
and depression are examples of conditions that can reduce one’s level 
of empathy. In the case of brain dysfunctions, a lack of empathy is asso-
ciated with misunderstanding the rules of social life, as is the case with 
the mental disabilities of people on the autism spectrum. Other brain 
dysfunctions result in a tendency to use violence against others, which 
is the case with psychopaths and sociopaths, both of whom suffer from 
personality disorders characterized by a lack of empathy. These dys-
functions manifest themselves when an individual is under the influence 
of environmental factors and thus reacts in accordance with his genetic 
predispositions. Both factors, social and genetic, are equally important 
(Baron-Cohen, 2014, pp. 136–139).
 The environmental factor is also an institutional factor. However, it is 
impossible to accept the thesis that institutional violence results merely 
from the fact that superiors and employees of an institution suffer from 
psychological disorders. The thesis that some professions attract people 
who lack empathy can be posed, especially when the use of violence is 
embedded in professional activities performed by uniformed officers of 
the police or the military, for example. This assumption does not explain 
all the pathologies of institutional systems, as they themselves produce 
internal pathologically violent situations.
 When describing the phenomenon of witness passivity towards vio-
lence inflicted on others, the German philosopher Hannah Arendt came 
to interesting conclusions about evil within the system.
In every bureaucratic system the shifting of responsibilities is a matter of daily 
routine, and if one wishes to define bureaucracy in terms of political science, 
that is, as a form of government – the rule of offices, as contrasted to the rule of 
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men, of one man, or of the few, or of the many – bureaucracy unhappily is the 
rule of nobody and for this very reason perhaps the least human and most cruel 
form of rulership (Arendt, 2003, p. 64).
 To describe the structures of institutionalised violence, Arendt used 
the technical metaphor of an employee (an officer within the system) 
understood as a cog in a machine. Such employees carry out orders 
without thinking about the meaning of their actions, and their individual 
responsibility is a marginal issue. Sometimes this takes place in circum-
stances in which the welfare of the individual is threatened by the loss 
of employment, livelihood, or a reduction in their living standards, for 
example. Sometimes the individual is not fully aware of his consent to 
violence because he is an opportunist; he wishes to avoid problems, or 
he looks for easy solutions. This refers to violence that one inflicts and 
violence that is inflicted on one. Employees are expected to approve 
and follow impersonal, parameterised, more or less clearly articulated 
rules of conduct. With time, and in accordance with the etymology of its 
Latin name, an organisation (or organum) wants to become a whole, 
so it demands more and more recognition and approval for its own pri-
orities and assumes that the company’s goals and mission are also its 
employees’ goals and mission.
 Within institutions, the perpetrators of violence are most often decent 
people who perform their duties perfectly, adhere to high standards 
in their private lives, and are exemplary parents to their children. As 
employees in the system, they stop thinking and compartmentalise their 
own responsibility into the narrow range of duties that are assigned to 
them. Hence, violence can be made trivial and mechanical and is no 
longer identified as a sign of moral evil. Under these circumstances, an 
employee’s conscience, even when he does use it, will not allow guilt. In 
these circumstances, it is difficult to speak of awareness of moral guilt for 
an act that has been committed. Paradoxically, using and experiencing 
violence becomes an element of one’s everyday professional activities 
and an element of distorted work regulations (Arendt, 2003, pp. 65–69). 
This argument does not excuse the perpetrators of violence because the 
legal and moral responsibility for the committed act concerns the indi-
vidual. The problem is the violence mechanism of the institution itself.: its 
extreme forms can be observed during wars and social conflicts, but in 
a milder form this mechanism is part of almost all bureaucratic structures.
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 The expression “nobody’s rule” also deserves attention. We usually 
imagine the rule of tyrants (dictators) as a centralized source of power 
that enforces control over almost every aspect of the life of the individual 
(the citizens and workers). However, this form of nobody’s rule is in fact 
the rule of impersonal mathematical procedures and computer algo-
rithms that translate into practice for employees’ social and professional 
lives. Our consenting to becoming subordinate to procedures makes 
us hostage to a system of rewards for compliance and penalties for 
non-compliance. In this way, violence blends into the system of penal-
ties (and sometimes rewards) when a deserved prize is not awarded or 
when it is given to the obedient for their faithful service to the system. The 
ruler (the president of a corporation) of a hierarchical structure may be 
a friendly and sensitive person who is responsible for the proper mode 
of the functioning of the institution. He does not have to suffer from any 
psychological dysfunctions in order for an institution to act oppressively. 
He does not want evil for his employees and is empathic, which, how-
ever, does not affect the violent nature of the institution’s functioning. 
A person who manages an institution always has someone (a different 
kind of nobody) or something (social prestige, economic results, public 
opinion) to which he is actually or allegedly subordinate. In such a situa-
tion, violence is only a consequence of widespread oppression to which 
everyone is subject, and this is, interestingly, almost voluntary.
social ethics and violence: conclusions 
and recommendations
Is it possible to create non-violent institutions? Man is a free being 
and can influence the processes in which he functions. People work in 
institutions. The individual’s impact is often significantly limited either by 
his personal dysfunctions, such as his misunderstanding or poor under-
standing of the rules of social life, or by the hierarchical dependencies 
that exist within institutions. The lower the position of an employee within 
the structure, the less influence he has on the functioning of the institu-
tion as a whole. The efficiency and range – and thus the responsibility – 
of decision makers’ activities is greater than that of their subordinates. 
The vast majority of institutions are of a hierarchical nature; however, it 
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is important to be familiar with and to understand the individual and insti-
tutional causes of phenomena in which violence is manifested and to 
oppose them to the best of our ability. We should not give up hope of 
changing the functioning of institutions, even though the efforts of single 
individuals may have little social impact. 
 In Catholic Social Teaching, the problem of violence is treated as 
an aspect of moral evil which is linked with social injustice and the 
malfunctioning of sin-based human management structures. Because 
of pride and selfishness, people are hermetic in their understanding of 
the world and have an unhealthy need to dominate others. These ten-
dencies manifest themselves in various institutions and take real shape 
within them; they are based on concrete forms of violence. Showing and 
describing various forms of social evil becomes the basis for a critical 
assessment of institutions and for defending the rights of the poor, the 
weak, the wronged, and the professionally excluded. The sharpness of 
this judgment depends on the scale of injustice and the forms of violence. 
The intent of Catholic Social Teaching is not to structure and organise 
social life but to guide and form the consciences of workers and supe-
riors in order to improve their institutions. It is based on the assumption 
that man should strive to achieve a “complete form of humanism” in 
his personal and social life. The aim of Catholic Social Teaching is to 
liberate man from everything that oppresses us and to strive for the 
“development of the whole man and of all men” (Pontifical Council of 
Justitia et Pax, 2005, p. 126). The question that arises, however, is how 
we are to achieve this.
 Throughout history, people have developed concepts of action that, 
by nature, were non-violent and yet led to radical social and political 
changes. This was the case with Gandhi’s non-violence movement and 
the Polish Solidarity movement, for example. The social movement that 
focused on the idea of solidarity in 1989 led to the collapse of structures 
based on violence in the block of socialist countries. In the case of the 
Ahimsa principle, promoted by Gandhi in India in the 1940s, and in 
the case of the “solidarity movement”, great importance was attached 
to the values and attitudes they upheld, such as friendship, kindness, 
the willingness to sacrifice one’s own life for the good of others, social 
justice, the defence of the weak and the wronged, and an understand-
ing between people from different social groups, who often represented 
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different political views. Nowadays, people from Poland and Europe 
suffer from a lack of solidarity and have lost hope that something can 
be changed for the better in the world of politics and the functioning of 
institutions.
 Enthusiasm for the social changes of those times is difficult to recre-
ate now, although it is not impossible. The “fight without violence” idea 
advocates moving away from destruction and focusing on shaping 
a person’s ethical attitude by controlling individual desires and passions. 
A person’s ethics-based refusal to cooperate with a violence-governed 
state or institution is of great social significance. Even if only a handful 
of people refuse to cooperate with such states or institutions, this is not 
meaningless because it can affect others. Authentic social life is based 
on an ethical demand, which in fact consists of a radical and conscious 
responsibility for what is subject to individual human choices. The 
thoughtless acceptance of structures based on violence has no excuse. 
An ethical attitude that is directed at affirming the dignity of the human 
person consists in avoiding excuses for tolerating, using, or submitting to 
violence within institutions; in actively protesting against violence (even 
when it does not directly affect us); and in trying to oppose it as well as 
we can. This is based on ethical, metapolitical, and meta-institutional 
factors that confront us with people’s vulnerability and the harm that is 
done to them.
 Human communities are communities because of the values they 
share. Developing and cultivating a community of values such as respect 
for the other person, the common good, solidarity, or social justice, 
involves a commitment to social life. A community of values does not 
mean political monism, in which everyone has to share the same views, 
but pluralism in terms of common values. This is desirable in order to 
appreciate the diversity of attitudes and forms of participation within 
society. The requirements of acceptance and our respect for difference 
lead us beyond the bounds of procedures and rigidly defined rules of 
conduct, thus liberating institutions from violent practices. An ethical 
attitude requires, on the one hand, openness to a diversity of views and 
attitudes and, on the other hand, affirmation of the fundamental value, 
i.e. human dignity.
 The issue of violence has been analysed from different perspec-
tives, including personal, social, economic, media, and ethical ones. 
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Researchers approach violence from a descriptive or normative per-
spective. In addition to the literature listed in the References section, 
the following works are worth recommending: 1) Jean-Hervé Lorenzi, 
Mickaël Berrebi. (2015). Un monde de violences. L’économie mon-
diale 2016–2030, 2) Agnieszka Lewicka-Zelent (ed.). (2017). Przemoc 
rodzinna. Aspekty psychologiczne, pedagogiczne i prawne [Domestic 
violence. Psychological, pedagogical, and legal aspects] Warszawa: 
Difin; 3) Simon Critcheley. (2006). Infinitely Demanding. A Political 
Ethics; 4) Robert B. Cialdini. (2016). Pre-suasion. A Revolutionary Way 
to Influence and Persuade; 5) Bogdan Wojciszke. (2002). Człowiek 
wśród ludzi. Zarys psychologii społecznej [A man among people. An out-
line of social psychology], Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar; 
6) Józef Sowa. (2007). Przemoc w aspekcie aksjologicznym [Violence 
in an axiological aspect]. In: Beata Szluz (ed.), Przemoc – konteksty 
społeczno­kulturowe [Violence – social and cultural contexts]. Vol. 1: 
Społeczne i psychologiczne aspekty zjawiska [Social and psychologi-
cal aspects of the phenomenon], Rzeszów: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu 
Rzeszowskiego, pp. 12–15.
 The following book by a French management theorist, Frederic 
Laloux, deserves special attention: Frederic Laloux, Reinventing Orga-
nizations (2014). In this publication, the author presents an alternative to 
the authoritarian and hierarchical model of management, i.e. turquoise 
management, which has an important advantage as it eliminates the 
traditional causes of institutional violence. It should be verified in prac-
tice as to whether the turquoise management model is feasible within 
various institutional structures.
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